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Understanding rational actions requires perspective taking both
with respect to means and with respect to objectives. This study
addresses the question of whether the two kinds of perspective
taking develop simultaneously or in sequence. It is argued that evi-
dence from competitive behavior is best suited for settling this
issue. A total of 71 kindergarten children between 3 and 5 years
of age participated in a competitive game of dice and were tested
on two traditional false belief stories as well as on several control
tasks (verbal intelligence, inhibitory control, and working mem-
ory). The frequency of competitive poaching moves in the game
correlated with correct predictions of mistaken actions in the false
belief task. Hierarchical linear regression after controlling for age
and control variables showed that false belief understanding sig-
niﬁcantly predicted the amount of poaching moves. The results
speak for an interrelated development of the capacity for ‘‘instru-
mental’’ and ‘‘telic’’ perspective taking. They are discussed in the
light of teleology as opposed to theory use and simulation.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
According to a time-honored view, explanations of intentional actions show the agent ‘‘in his role
of Rational Animal’’ (Davidson, 1963). Intentional actions are inherently goal-directed. They are, in
other words, intelligible in terms of what the agent regarded as an effective means to achieve some
objective. To explain an intentional action in this way is to make rational sense of the action—to show.
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546 B. Priewasser et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 116 (2013) 545–559it to have been a rational thing to do, at least in some minimal sense of ‘‘rationality.’’ As Davidson put
it, ‘‘From the agent’s point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action’’
(emphasis added pp. 691).
Now we can distinguish two ways in which the agent’s point of view may differ from that of the
interpreter (someone seeking to understand why the agent did what she did). First, the interpreter
may regard the means adopted by the agent as mistaken or suboptimal. Second, the interpreter might
not share the agent’s objective, possibly (but not necessarily) because it is incompatible with his own
objectives. Then, if the time-honored view is correct, understanding intentional actions would seem to
require a basic form of perspective taking, both in relation to means and in relation to objectives. First,
the interpreter needs to be able to explain an action in terms of the agent’s instrumental beliefs—
beliefs he might not regard as correct. We call this ability ‘‘instrumental perspective taking.’’ For
example, the interpreter needs to ﬁnd it intelligible, in a standard false belief task, that in order to re-
trieve his chocolate, Max chooses to go to the blue cupboard owing to his false belief that this is where
the chocolate is. Second, the interpreter needs to be able to explain an action in terms of a goal he does
not share or does not take to be worthwhile. We call this ability ‘‘telic perspective taking.’’ There are, of
course, a variety of reasons why an interpreter might not endorse the agent’s goal. Perhaps he thinks
the goal reﬂects a mistaken instrumental belief about how to achieve some further goal (e.g., the agent
may seek to open a certain bottle because she mistakenly believes it contains gin). Or, more interest-
ingly, he may regard the proposed outcome as undesirable or bad (e.g., he may regard the agent’s hav-
ing another glass of gin as undesirable because it would be harmful to her or because he would like to
ﬁnish off the bottle himself). Again, of course, the interpreter might simply be indifferent to the agent’s
enterprise.
A basic developmental question raised by this distinction is whether children acquire the capacity
for perspective taking with respect to objectives and with respect to means at the same time. Three-
year-olds are notoriously poor at predicting and explaining intentional actions in terms of mistaken
instrumental beliefs—means falsely regarded by the agent as effective (Wellman, Cross, & Watson,
2001). But are they able to explain actions in terms of objectives they do not share? A stable ﬁnding
in the development of belief–desire psychology is that in some ways young children ﬁnd it easier to
come to grips with desires than with beliefs. Thus, it is sometimes said that young children are ‘‘desire
psychologists’’ before they acquire a ‘‘desire–belief psychology’’ (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman,
1990). One might interpret this theory as holding that telic perspective taking precedes instrumental
perspective taking. There are a number of extant ﬁndings that may seem to support this view—
ﬁndings that are often thought to show that children understand the subjectivity of desires before
they understand the subjectivity of beliefs (Rakoczy, 2010; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Closer inspec-
tion, however, reveals that ‘‘appreciating the subjectivity of desires’’ can mean a number of things, not
all of which involve telic perspective taking. On the speciﬁc issue of the development of instrumental
and telic perspective taking, the extant evidence, we contend, is inconclusive. The aim of the current
study was to present new evidence that directly speaks to that issue.
Perner, Zauner, and Sprung (2005, Fig. 11.4) reviewed several studies using three different para-
digms that were considered as relevant in this context—wicked desires, conﬂicting desires, and com-
petition—and their relation to performance on the false belief task. The results of these studies
appeared to support the theory that there is a single capacity emerging that enables both instrumental
and telic perspective taking at the same age (’’uniﬁed perspective thesis’’). Subsequent studies with
these paradigms led to contradictory results. We look at these data more closely later in the Discus-
sion. First, it is important to clarify when exactly understanding different desires requires telic per-
spective taking. This was not satisfactorily explained in Perner et al. (2005).
A clearer answer to this question has emerged from a reconceptualization of belief–desire psychol-
ogy as ‘‘teleology-in-perspective’’ (Perner & Roessler, 2010). This was motivated by solving some foun-
dational problems with the two dominant characterizations of folk psychology as a theory or as
simulation. One motivation was to remind the ﬁeld (pace theory theory) that folk psychology sees be-
liefs and desires not just as causes of behavior but also as reasons for acting (Anscombe, 1957; David-
son, 1963). With reference to the standard ‘‘Mistaken Max’’ false belief paradigm (Wimmer & Perner,
1983), where Max does not witness the unexpected transfer of his chocolate to a different location: on
a causal view one can explain Max’s mistaken action by saying that circumstances cause him to have
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chocolate, this belief causes him to go to the wrong location. This is treating the mind as a causal net-
work on a par with physical causation. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) explicitly subscribed to such a
picture.
In our understanding, folk psychology sees it differently. Max is not just driven to go to the wrong
location but he has reasons to go there: wanting his chocolate, he has reasons to go where it is. He has
a point of view on the matter. One strength of simulation theory is to capture the agent’s point of view.
One pretends to have the same experiences as Max, and this supposedly triggers similar internal
states. By introspection (Goldman, 1989; Goldman, 2006), one then discovers that these are a belief
that the chocolate is still in its old place and an action tendency to go there. It is, however, intuitively
not at all clear that we actually proceed in this way, and the existence of introspection of this kind has
been a perennial problem (Carruthers, 2011; Gordon, 1995). Instead, Max’s point of view can be
brought to the fore without taking on the theoretical burdens of simulation theory by teleology-
in-perspective (Perner & Roessler, 2010). Reasons for action, in the most basic sense, are pairs not
of mental states but rather of (typically nonpsychological) facts that count in favor of someone’s acting
in a certain way—for example, the fact that it is desirable that Max should obtain his chocolate and the
fact that he can do so by going to the place where the chocolate is. Practical deliberation is usually
concerned with reasons in that sense. Now a simple-minded way to explain intentional actions would
be to appeal to the reason-giving facts that causally explain the action. We call this ‘‘pure teleology.’’
(For a defense of the claim that such explanations could count as causal, and for some discussion of the
relation between reasons and causes, see Perner & Roessler, 2010, section 5). This approach, of course,
backﬁres in the false belief scenario because a mistaken agent will not go where he objectively should
go. A more sophisticated interpreter appreciates that people act on the basis of what they take them-
selves to have reason to do, where this will reﬂect their beliefs about the world. To work out what Max
will do, given his false belief, the interpreter needs to reason counterfactually: she needs to consider
what Max would have reason to do if his belief were true (i.e., if the chocolate were still in its old loca-
tion). This form of reasoning (which we call teleology-in-perspective) enables the interpreter to ﬁnd
Max’s action intelligible in terms of his perspective on his reasons without simulation—without need-
ing to generate pretend beliefs and action tendencies within oneself and introspect on them, as sim-
ulation theory requires.
Now we can return to our question of what counts as evidence for children’s ability to engage in
telic perspective taking. Pure teleology works on objective facts—an evaluative fact about a state that
it is objectively worth achieving (needed, desirable, good, etc., which makes this state a goal) (e.g., that
Max be with his chocolate) and objectively appropriate instrumental actions that achieve the goal
(e.g., Max to walk where the chocolate is). The question is, what conditions—speciﬁcally relating to
divergent goals—make this explanatory schema unworkable. Appreciation of competitive games is a
good candidate.
In a competitive game, one’s moves serve not only to further one’s own goal but also do sabotage
the opponent’s moves that further her goal. Suppose my chess partner can put me into checkmate on
her next turn. To appreciate the signiﬁcance of this fact, I need to recognize that from her perspective
it is desirable that I should be checkmated. That, after all, is why she can be expected to make the
move in question unless I can think of a way of protecting my king. So I need to ﬁnd a way to bring
about the (frommy perspective) desirable goal of not being checkmated while simultaneously bearing
in mind that from my opponent’s point of view it is desirable that I should be checkmated. Evidently,
me being checkmated and me not being checkmated cannot both be objectively desirable without qual-
iﬁcation. So the sophisticated teleologist needs to consider each goal under a different perspective. In
contrast, a young teleologist who, by hypothesis, cannot consider different perspectives will therefore
not ﬁnd any sense or enjoyment in competitive games.
Consequently, the uniﬁed perspective thesis predicts that children who have no awareness of per-
spective (measured by not passing the false belief test) should ﬁnd no pleasure in competitive games.
Moreover, these two abilities should emerge in unison. In contrast, the desire-before-belief theory has
no reason to assume that competitive games should not be appreciated before false beliefs, and it does
not predict any relationship between these two abilities.
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ceive. Children found deception considerably more difﬁcult than sabotage. In the two sabotage condi-
tions, children needed to decide whether they wanted to lock a box with a treasure or leave it open
when the robber came to steal the treasure (one-box trial) or whether they wanted to lock the empty
box or the one with the treasure (two-box trial). They were told that they should not let the robber
ﬁnd the treasure. Importantly, this instruction already speciﬁed the robber’s action to be undermined,
and so there was no need to infer this action from the robber’s goal. Preventing something by being
explicitly told what to prevent should not cause a problem for the teleologist child. Indeed, most of
the 3- to 5-year-olds chose the correct action (lock instead of leave open) or box (full instead of
empty). Moreover, Sodian and Frith (1992) compared the same sabotage tasks with false belief attri-
bution and found that for normal children sabotage was only slightly easier than the false belief task.
Other studies using this paradigm (Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Hughes, Dunn, & White, 1998) did not re-
port sabotage and deception separately. In sum, even if this sabotage task did require telic perspective
taking, the reported differences are too small to speak against the uniﬁed perspective thesis.
There are also some data on children’s appreciation of competitive games. A venerable study by
Gratch (1964; see also deVries, 1970) showed that the percentages of children showing competitive
fervor in the good old penny hiding game (guessing in which hand a marble is hidden) increased from
near zero to 100% between 3 to 6 years of age in a very similar fashion to corresponding percentages of
children passing the false belief test in the later literature (Perner et al., 2005, Fig. 11.4). Although sev-
eral other studies (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Chasiotis, Kiessling, Hofer, & Campos, 2006; Hughes & Dunn,
1998; Hughes et al., 1998) have used the penny hiding game in conjunction with the false belief test,
they evaluated only children’s deceptive skills and not their competitive attitudes. The above-
mentioned data seem to speak clearly in favor of a uniﬁed perspective thesis. Unfortunately,
appreciation of the penny hiding game hinges not only on appreciating competition but also on under-
standing the consequences of information manipulation such as the false belief task. So we cannot be
sure whether the reported correlations are due to what the theory predicts, namely a correlation be-
tween understanding false beliefs and appreciating competition, or due to both tasks depending on
understanding the effects of information deprivation.
To get clearer evidence for a link between understanding false beliefs and appreciating competitive
games, we adapted a competitive game that has no evident aspects of information manipulation or
hiding like the penny game. Benenson, Nicholson, Waite, Roy, and Simpson (2001; see also Roy &
Benenson, 2002; Weinberger & Stein, 2008) designed a game to investigate interference competition,
in which one individual reduces another individual’s chances of gaining access to a resource (Roy &
Benenson, 2002). This is a simple game of dice where each player needs to collect beads on a stick.
The aim of the game is to be the ﬁrst to reach a ﬁnish mark. Most important, the players are allowed
to choose whether they want to take beads from the communal pile or from another player. Children’s
competitive attitude is measured by the percentage of moves in which they take beads from another
player (poaching move) and not from the communal depository. The goal of a poaching move, evi-
dently, is to thwart the other player’s goal of reaching the top of the stack before the player making
the poaching move. According to the uniﬁed perspective thesis, children who are not able to under-
stand others’ perspectives cannot form the goal of thwarting an incompatible goal. A correlation be-
tween children’s performance on the false belief task and the amount of poaching moves in the bead
collecting game, therefore, would support the uniﬁed perspective thesis. On the other hand, if the con-
ventional view is correct and children are aware of the subjectivity of desires before they understand
the subjectivity of beliefs (Wellman, 1990), there should be no correlation between poaching moves
and false belief performance.Method
Participants
A total of 86 children between the ages of 2;10 (years;months) and 5;10 (M = 4;3, SD = 8.9 months)
from four different nursery schools in the city of Salzburg and two villages in Upper Austria volun-
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of them played the bead collecting game only, and therefore the number of playgroup members differs
from the number of the ﬁnal sample). Of the 28 game group triads, 3 needed to be excluded because of
peculiar playing behavior of 1 participant in each group that strongly inﬂuenced the course of the
game; of these participants, 1 child started to cry because another player took beads from her, 1 child
monotonously took beads from the left neighbor without responding to the game itself, and 1 child
continuously took beads from the best friend to please him. The remaining 25 playgroups consisted
of 3 all-male triads, 2 all-female triads, 8 one-female/two-male triads, and 12 one-male/two-female
triads. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 35 girls (mean age = 4;4, SD = 8.7 months) and 36 boys (mean
age = 4;3, SD = 9.5 months).
Design
Each child participated in both a game session within a group of three children and in an individual
test session. The two sessions took place on the same day or on a later day but never more than 1 week
later. Approximately half of the children participated ﬁrst in the game and then in the individual test
session and vice versa. The playgroup triads for the game were formed randomly among the children
of each kindergarten class whose parents had agreed to let them participate in the study. Playing the
game took between 5 and 10 min. The individual test sessions lasted approximately 15 min, and chil-
dren were given ﬁve tasks in a completely randomized order. Each child completed a verbal intelli-
gence test (Petermann, 2009), a visual working memory task (Daseking & Petermann, 2002), a
phonological working memory task (Grimm, 2001), a day/night Stroop task (Gerstadt, Hong, &
Diamond, 1994), and two false belief tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
Procedure and materials
Bead collecting game
The game was adapted from Benenson and colleagues (2001). In our version, we used three woo-
den stands with an upright stick, a basket with 50 wooden beads, and a large die with numbers of dots
from 1 through 3. The game required the players to collect beads and thread them onto their vertical
stand. Two female researchers accompanied three children at a time to a quiet room where the game
materials were already positioned in a semicircle on a carpet on the ﬂoor. One experimenter sat down
with the children, and for a ﬁrst warm-up children were asked to pick a stand for playing the game and
were invited to put three beads on their stand. After that, the experimenter explained the rules of the
game in a standardized routine. She emphasized that the aim of the game was to ﬁll the stand to the
top as quickly as possible and that children could take the number of beads according to the number of
dots on the die either from the community basket (‘‘neutral move’’) or from another player (‘‘poaching
move’’). They were further told that the player who ﬁlled the stand ﬁrst would be the winner of the
game. A practice round was conducted, with each child being asked to repeat the game rules individ-
ually (‘‘Where are you allowed to take beads from?’’ and ‘‘Can you tell me how you can win the
game?’’). In case of incorrect or incomplete answers, the rules were explained again until the child
was able to answer both questions correctly (‘‘the basket, Player 1, and Player 2’’ and ‘‘be the ﬁrst
whose stand is completely ﬁlled’’, respectively). To make children constantly aware that there were
two legitimate options of taking beads, each child was asked after every die throw whether she or
he would like to take the beads from the basket or from another player’s stand. The second experi-
menter was seated on a chair some distance from the children where she could see the die and the
three stands. For each individual move, the number on the die and the location from where the player
took the beads were recorded.
False belief task
Two standard unexpected transfer false belief tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) were administered.
The picture stories were displayed on a laptop (PowerPoint) and narrated by the experimenter. Apart
from different protagonists (female/male), toys (teddy/ball), siblings (brother/sister), and storage
places (box/cupboard), the two versions were exactly the same. In the story, the protagonist brieﬂy
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kitchen. Meanwhile, a sibling transferred the toy to a new container. At this point, children were asked
three comprehension questions: ‘‘Where is the toy now?’’, ‘‘Who placed it there?’’, and ‘‘Where did the
protagonist place the toy at ﬁrst?’’ If a child gave an incorrect answer to one of the questions, the story
was retold. No child needed more than one repetition before giving three correct responses. The story
continued with the protagonist coming back and wanting to play with the toy again, and the prediction
questionwas posed: ‘‘Where will he [she] ﬁrst look for the toy?’’ Next, children were told that the pro-
tagonist would actually look in the empty location and were asked the explanation question: ‘‘Why did
he [she] go there to get the toy?’’ Finally, two memory questionswere asked to check whether answers
to the test questions were not due to misremembering the story facts: ‘‘Where is the toy now?’’ and
‘‘Where did the protagonist place the toy at ﬁrst?’’
Control measures
To be able to check whether the correlation between game and false belief task is due to differences
in intelligence, inhibitory control, or working memory, the following tasks were used.
Verbal intelligence test. The vocabulary subtest of the German version of the Wechsler Preschool and
Primary Scale of Intelligence–Third Edition (Petermann, 2009) consisted of 26 pictures of an object
(e.g., car, fork, pineapple) that children needed to identify.
Day/night task. The procedure, instructions, and sequence of the Stroop-like task was administered
following Gerstadt and colleagues (1994). After ascertaining that children associate a picture of a
sun with daytime and a picture of a moon with nighttime, children were instructed to say ‘‘day’’ when
shown the picture of the moon and to say ‘‘night’’ when shown the picture of the sun. If a child an-
swered incorrectly in 2 practice trials, the instruction was repeated as often as necessary. The adjacent
test consisted of 16 trials in a ﬁxed random order, and no feedback was provided.
Working memory measures. As a measure for visual working memory capacity, we ran a subtest from a
German battery of cognitive development tests (Daseking & Petermann, 2002). Children were shown
10 different objects (e.g., house, ball, baby) depicted on an A4-sized piece of paper (i.e., approximately
2 inches in size) with the instruction to remember as many objects as possible for later recall. After a
1-min learning phase (in which children were asked to name every object at least once so that the
experimenter knew the terms the children used), children had 1.5 min (90 s) to recall the objects. Pho-
nological working memory was assessed with a subtest from a German battery of language develop-
ment tests (Grimm, 2001). Children needed to repeat the names (pseudowords) of 18 funny-looking
little paper men who came out of a bag when called by their correct names. Pseudowords were pre-
sented in a ﬁxed order and pronounced only once.
Results
Theory of mind
False belief prediction
Only 1 child gave a wrong answer to one of the ﬁve control questions. Performance on the two
story versions (61% and 49% correct) did not differ signiﬁcantly (McNemar’s v2(1, N = 71) = 14.4,
p = .115). For this and all subsequent calculations, two-tailed test results and exact p values are re-
ported. Of the total sample, 29 children gave two correct predictions, 20 gave one correct prediction,
and 22 gave no correct predictions.
False belief explanation
Children’s answers on the explanation test question were classiﬁed according to the following cat-
egories (see Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002): (1) mental state, 18 answers (e.g., ‘‘he thought it was in
there,’’ ‘‘she doesn’t know it’s in the other box,’’ ‘‘he didn’t see it being moved’’); (2) relevant story
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answers (e.g., ‘‘because he wants the ball’’); (4) wrong location, 9 answers (e.g., ‘‘she should go over
there’’); (5) irrelevant facts, 5 answers (e.g., ‘‘he is silly,’’ ‘‘because he is wearing a blue jacket’’); and
(6) no or ‘‘don’t know,’’ 28 answers. In the case of multiple answers, the one that ﬁt the highest cat-
egory was used.
For further analysis, these categories were recoded as understanding (2 points for category 1 an-
swers), transitional (1 point for category 2 answers), and no understanding (0 points for answers in cat-
egories 3–6). Explanations referring to the protagonist’s desire (category 3) were coded as incorrect
because insisting on the agent’s desire to justify an erroneous action is uninformative (Wimmer &
Mayringer, 1998). In contrast, relevant story facts (category 2) were scored as correct because even
an adult might answer in this way as a shorthand indication of the causal source of the agent’s error.
However, because it is not clear whether referring to a relevant story fact is a reliable indicator for
false belief understanding, category 2 answers were coded as transitional answers.Relating prediction and explanation
Taking both stories together, children could reach a total score ranging from 0 to 6 consisting of 0 to
2 points for correct predictions and 0 to 4 points for their explanations (explanation scores as deﬁned
above). Number of correct answers to the prediction (0–2) and explanation (0–4) questions were cor-
related, Spearman’s rho (71) = .44, p = .001. On the basis of the total score, the sample was divided into
three groups, where 19 children (mean age = 48 months, 11 boys and 8 girls) reached a total score of 0
or 1 and were classiﬁed as non-understanders, 27 children (mean age = 49 months, 15 boys and 12
girls) reached a total score of 2 or 3 and were classiﬁed as transitionals, and 25 children (mean
age = 57 months, 10 boys and 15 girls) reached a total score of 4 to 6 and were classiﬁed as understand-
ers. As Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006) showed, understanding false beliefs is not an abrupt acquisi-
tion but rather undergoes an identiﬁable transitional period of acquisition. With our tripartite division
of understanders–transitionals–non-understanders, we tried to capture these distinctions.Bead collecting game
The number of rounds that were played in the 25 groups varied between 5 and 15 (M = 7.6),
depending on the amount of poaching moves and on luck in casting the die. The majority of moves
were neutral (74% beads taken out of the box) compared with poaching moves (26% beads taken from
another player). The individual number of poaching moves varied between 0 and 14. Here, 25 children
(35%, 8 girls and 17 boys) made no poaching move at all, and 17 children (24%, 14 girls and 3 boys)
made only one such move. The remaining 29 children (41%, 13 girls and 16 boys) made more than
one poaching move. For further analysis, the proportion of poaching moves to the total number of
moves was used.Table 1
Correlations (Spearman’s rho) among false belief task, poaching moves, age, and control tasks.
Mean% (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Age (months) .51*** .51*** .33** .54*** .45*** .32** .36***
1. Poaching moves .46*** .17 .34** .08 .12 .13
2. False belief prediction 55.0 (42.4) .44*** .48*** .36** .38** .28*
3. False belief explanation 39.4 (30.4) .40*** .28* .25* .24*
4. Verbal intelligence 72.6 (12.6) .47*** .52*** .33**
5. Inhibitory control 71.1 (33.0) .36** .10
6. Phonological working memory 60.4 (20.8) .09
7. Visual working memory 61.7 (15.7)
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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Means and standard deviations of the four control tasks are reported in Table 1. Four children did
not participate in the phonological working memory task because of either motivational (n = 1) or
spelling (n = 3) problems, and one child refused to take part in the visual working memory task. Miss-
ing data were replaced by mean substitution (i.e., replacing values with the sample mean).
Relating false belief understanding to competition
A total of 42 children made either one or no poaching move, and therefore the assumptions of nor-
mality were not satisﬁed. A Kruskal–Wallis test was conducted to compare the proportion of poaching
moves across the three false belief groups. There was a signiﬁcant effect of groups, H(2) = 8.55,
p = .014. Post hoc comparisons using Mann–Whitney test indicated that the median of the proportion
of poaching moves was signiﬁcantly higher for false belief understanders than for non-understanders,
U = 115.0, z = 2.95, p = .003, r = .45. However, the transitional group (Mdn = 16.67) did not differ
signiﬁcantly from either the false belief understanders (Mdn = 33.34) or the non-understanders
(Mdn = 0.00), U = 254.5, z = 1.54, p = .124, r = .21, and U = 195.5, z = 1.43, p = .152, r = .21,
respectively.
Furthermore, the correlation between false belief understanding and poaching moves was exam-
ined. Spearman’s rho revealed a statistically signiﬁcant relation between false belief scores (0–6)
and proportion of poaching moves, rs(71) = .36, p = .002. Table 1 shows that this correlation was
mostly due to performance on the prediction task and displays all other relevant raw correlations.
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test whether performance on the false belief
prediction task signiﬁcantly predicted the proportion of poaching moves over and above age and con-
trol variables. Whereas age explained 26% of the variance, R2 = .26, F(1, 69) = 24.12, p = .000, control
variables made no signiﬁcant further contribution to explaining variance, R2 change = .05, F(4,
65) = 1.15, p = .34. However, when predictions in the false belief task were added as a predictor
(b = .26, p = .036), the model improved signiﬁcantly, R2 change = .046, F(1, 64) = 4.57, p = .036. Perfor-
mance on the false belief task, therefore, explains variance in addition to age and cognitive abilities.Number of times being poached
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Fig. 1. Regression lines for each false belief group depicting the relation between the number of poaching moves committed by
the child and the number of poaching moves suffered by the child. Single data points can include one to four children.
Exception: Data point 0–0 includes seven non-understanders, seven transitionals, and three understanders.
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only with children’s understanding of false belief but also strongly with how often their opponents
took beads from them. Indeed, the number of times a child suffered a poaching move and the number
of times the child committed such a move were highly correlated, rs(71) = .64, p < .001. To gain a better
understanding of how this relationship may be affected by children’s understanding of false beliefs,
we regressed the number of poaching moves by the child on the number of times the child suffered
a poaching move separately for each false belief group. The resulting regression lines are shown in
Fig. 1. They are markedly different. Notably, only the understanders, b = .78, t(23) = 6.02, p < .001,
and the transitionals, b = .62, t(25) = 3.90, p < .001, showed a positive slope. The children who did
not understand false belief did not react in a retaliatory way to losing beads to others by taking beads
from them, b = .06, t(17) = 0.26, p = .797. This is very suggestive evidence that children without
understanding of perspective, as assessed by the false belief test, don’t understand that the means
to further the goal that their opponent gets more beads by taking some from them is incompatible
with the goal of their getting more beads.
To address the question of whether the slopes of the three groups are signiﬁcantly different, we
compared the unstandardized beta coefﬁcients by computing three individual two-sample t tests
using the standard error of these coefﬁcients for the error term. The results of the t tests indicated
a signiﬁcant difference among all three false belief groups. The slope of non-understanders was signif-
icantly different from the slopes of both understanders, t(42) = 3.86, p < .001, d = 1.18, and transition-
als, t(44) = 2.33, p = .02, d = 0.70. There was also a signiﬁcant difference between understanders and
transitionals, t(50) = 2.32, p = .02, d = 0.64.Gender differences
Benenson and colleagues (2001; see also Roy & Benenson, 2002; Weinberger & Stein, 2008) re-
ported that boys were more competitive than girls. So we looked at whether these differences would
be found in our study as well. Comparing the proportions of poaching moves between girls (Mdn = .17)Number of times being poached
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Fig. 2. Regression lines for girls and boys in the false belief understander group depicting the relation between the number of
poaching moves committed by the child and the number of poaching moves suffered by the child. Single data points can include
one to three children.
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groups separately, the only signiﬁcant gender difference in the proportion of poaching moves was
found in the group of understanders, U = 14.0, z = 3.40, p = .001, r = .68. In this group, boys made
signiﬁcantly more poaching moves (Mdn = .60) than girls (Mdn = .20). Again we regressed the number
of poaching moves by the child on the number of times the child suffered such a move for boys and
girls in the group of false belief understanders. The regression lines of girls and boys are shown in
Fig. 2. Although both girls and boys showed a signiﬁcant positive slope, b = .74, t(13) = 3.99,
p = .002, and b = .81, t(8) = 3.94, p = .004, respectively, the slopes (unstandardized beta coefﬁcients)
were signiﬁcantly different, t(23) = 2,45, p = .022, d = 1.04. No other signiﬁcant differences between
boys and girls were found.Discussion
The main result of this study was that very few children who failed the false belief task showed any
tendency to engage in competitive poaching moves. The paucity of such moves persisted even when
these children suffered from their opponents’ poaching moves. This is a strong sign that these children
cannot make sense of competitive behavior. In contrast, children who passed the false belief test en-
gaged more often in competitive poaching moves, and this tendency was enhanced when they were
subjected to such moves from others. Of course, not every child who understands competition neces-
sarily engages in competition, and girls seemed to be more reluctant in this respect than boys. But this
sex difference, which has been noted before (Benenson et al., 2001; Maccoby, 1990; Roy & Benenson,
2002), is limited to children who understand false beliefs.
This connection between understanding mistaken action in the false belief paradigm and compet-
itiveness in a game shows that, contrary to Wellman (1990), desires are not generally understood be-
fore beliefs. Rather, when reasoning with desires requires telic perspective taking, it emerges at the
same time as understanding mistaken actions due to a false belief, as hypothesized by Perner and
Roessler (2010). They characterized the developmental changes at this age as a move from pure tele-
ology that deals in objective facts and goals to teleology-in-perspective, which simultaneously pro-
vides for perspective taking with respect to means and ends.
To understand the impact of the current evidence in relation to earlier discussions of how false be-
lief understanding is related to understanding desires, it is important to consider that not all seem-
ingly relevant cases of ‘‘subjectivity’’ and of incompatible desires require awareness of perspective.
For instance, Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) found that as early as 18 months of age, children realize
that a person who had shown a preference for broccoli over yummy crackers should be given broccoli
when asking for something to eat rather than crackers that the children themselves clearly preferred
over broccoli. Several other studies reﬂected on children’s abilities to predict preferences and provided
similar data (e.g., Bartsch &Wellman, 1995; Rieffe, Terwogt, Koops, Stegge, & Oomen, 2001; Terwogt &
Rieffe, 2003; Wright Cassidy et al., 2005). Although the children apparently understand that prefer-
ences can be subjective, the teleologist can, nevertheless, understand the action goals as objectively
desirable without any need for telic perspective taking: a person who likes crackers should (objec-
tively) be given crackers, and a person who likes broccoli should (objectively) be given broccoli. Con-
sequently, preference differences of this kind pose no problem for the young teleologist who is
unaware of the existence of perspective differences.
Moore, Jarrold, Russell, Sapp, and MacCallum (1995, Experiment 2) investigated understanding of
incompatible goals, where children played in a puzzle competition against a puppet. On every turn, a
card was drawn from the stack. If it ﬁt into a player’s puzzle, that player could use it. At certain points
in the game, the child and the puppet had conﬂicting needs; one was hoping for a blue card, and the
other was hoping for a red card. Children were asked which card (red or blue) the puppet would want
to come up next. Only approximately 35% of 3- and 4-year-olds correctly reported that the opponent
would want a different color than what they needed for themselves. Furthermore, children’s perfor-
mance on this task was as low as their performance on a false belief task. However, follow-up studies
by Rakoczy, Warneken, and Tomasello (2007) and Rakoczy (2010) failed to show the results expected
if children needed telic perspective taking for these tasks. Incompatible desire tasks were as easy as
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why awareness of perspective should be necessary in these tasks. Note that correct answers to the test
questions provide no evidence that children understand that the players are engaged in competition.
Children merely need to understand that the puppet wants, say, a blue card to be drawn given, that
this is what is needed to complete the puzzle the puppet is working on, not that the puppet wants
a card to be drawn that will hinder completion of children’s own puzzle. The task does not require
simultaneously making sense of actions pursuing conﬂicting goals, and a teleologist may simply not
appreciate the competitive nature that we perceive in them.
Appreciation of incompatible goals has been reported in even younger infants. Behne, Carpenter,
Call, and Tomasello (2005) found that 9-month-olds reacted with more impatience (banging and
reaching) toward an adult who was unwilling to hand them a toy compared with an adult who was
trying but unable to do so. These reactions may suggest that infants see the unwilling adult motivated
by an opposing goal. However, the data can be easily accommodated within teleology. A child forms
one global goal of ‘‘the toy should be given to me,’’ and the child’s reaction will be different when
someone conforms to that goal and tries to do what should be done (give the child the toy) than when
someone does not try to do so. In fact, teleology explains extremely well why children react with
annoyance toward the unwilling. Obviously, when someone does not even try to do what should be
done, one has good reason to be annoyed.
Another line of research suggests that 10- to 12-month-olds use social dominance representations
to predict interactions between two agents in conﬂicting situations (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012;
Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011). In Mascaro and Csibra’s (2012) study, infants
ﬁrst watched one of two animated object agents get its way in a conﬂict situation (wanting the same
thing) and then expected the winner to prevail in a contextually different dominance contest thereaf-
ter (e.g., wanting to be in the same place). In Thomsen and colleagues’ (2011) study, infants predicted
that a big agent would prevail over a smaller agent when their goals were conﬂicting. Children,
however, need not see the interaction as one of conﬂicting goals. Recognizing that two agents are
on collision course and anticipating the consequences or how the collision can be avoided does not
show understanding of the conﬂicting goals that motivate these actions.
Research with even younger infants, 5- to 12-month-olds (Hamlin &Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, &
Bloom, 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003), demonstrated a preference for an agent who helped
another agent to get on top of a hill (helper) over an agent who prevented the agent from succeeding
(hinderer). Scarf, Imuta, Colombo, and Hayne (2012) reported that this preference may be largely due
to a confounded feature (joyful jumping by primary agent after being helped but not after being pre-
vented from succeeding). Yet even if the original preference due to helping can be re-established, it
would not point to an understanding of goals beyond pure teleology. Infants can work on the basis
of the objective goal that the primary agent should go to the top. Someone (or something) promoting
this goal (the good) will be seen as better than someone (or something) impeding this goal. Thus, in-
fants may develop a preference for the helper without understanding what the hinderer is doing in
terms of an incompatible goal.
Incompatible goals also have been used for assessing the understanding of emotional consequences
in older children (Perner et al., 2005). In one story, a boy and a girl sat in the same boat. The
boy wanted to take the canal to the left, and the girl wanted to take the canal to the right. After they
drifted to the right, children were asked to judge who was happier. In the control story, the boy and
girl each sat in a boat but otherwise had the same preferences. Again both boats drifted into the right
branch of the canal, and children were asked to judge who was happier. Answers in the ﬁrst story were
of equal difﬁculty and correlated with answers on a false belief test. Answers in the control story
were somewhat better. Again follow-up studies by Rakoczy and colleagues (2007; see also Rakoczy,
2010) failed to replicate this pattern. However, it is important to note that these data do not
speak to our question regarding telic perspective taking, since an awareness of perspectives is not re-
quired for correct answers. Children may pass such tests by relying on the following simple
generalization:
If an agent wants a certain kind of event to happen, the agent will be happy if such an event hap-
pens and will be unhappy if it does not happen.
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ment as to the desirability of a particular event. In this respect, the case of emotional reactions differs
from that of intentional actions. To explain an action as an intentional action just is to think of it as
performed for a reason, where this requires putting together an end (regarded as desirable) with a
means (regarded as effective). Furthermore, in the action case, it is hard even to formulate analogous
simple generalizations that are remotely plausible. Consider this proposal:
These tenets [of folk psychology] are perhaps best summarized by the ‘‘practical syllogism’’: ‘‘If a
psychological agent wants event y and believes that action x will cause event y, he will do x.’’
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 126)The problem is that this formulation cannot be directly used in a particular case. For instance, take
Mistaken Max (discussed in the Introduction). From his experiential conditions, we can infer that he
mistakenly believes his chocolate to be in its original place. We are told that he wants to get his choc-
olate. But we still do not know what Max believes about how to get to his chocolate. Naturally, we use
our own general world knowledge to ﬁgure that out: Max going there would be the most obvious way,
for all we know. It is often hard to see that such a piece of knowledge is missing because of its utter
triviality. But it is easy to think of examples highlighting the gap. For instance, suppose that Max has
been hospitalized and wants his chocolate. What will he do? We can give a sensible answer only if we
know more about his particular circumstances and then ﬁgure out what the possible ways for him to
get his chocolate would be (ask his mother to bring him the chocolate).
Tasks involving incompatible goals, therefore, denote a better test of telic perspective taking pro-
vided that simplifying strategies can be excluded. As a general rule, we need to exclude the possibility
of considering the different goals separately. Cases of sabotage and competitive games do serve this
purpose. Competition as a rational form of interaction is based on the combination of pursuing one’s
own goal and at the same time of frustrating the opponent’s strategies based on his or her incompat-
ible goal. Because the players’ goals are incompatible, they cannot be appreciated by a teleologist
working within a single perspective.
Previous investigations of children’s appreciation of competition in the penny hiding game (Gratch,
1964) provided age-compatible results and even correlations with the false belief task (Baron-Cohen,
1992; Chasiotis et al., 2006; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Hughes et al., 1998). Unfortunately, in this game,
understanding competition is intrinsically mixed up with understanding the dependence of action on
available information, which is also the central aspect of the false belief task. In contrast, moves in the
bead collecting game are completely independent from the ability to decode the other players’ level of
information. Thus, only the current study provides uncontaminated evidence that appreciation of
competition codevelops with understanding beliefs.
One might question, however, whether success on the task requires meta-representing one’s own
goal and one’s opponents’ goal. Might it not be possible to pass the task simply by forming the goal to
achieve a certain physical state (having a full bead stand while the opponents’ stands are not full)?1
One question, of course, is why anyone would adopt that particular goal. ‘‘My bead stand should be full
and the others’ stands should not’’ is hardly an intrinsically desirable state of affairs. On the face of it, it is
the competitive context that turns it into an intelligible goal. But in any case, the current suggestion
would leave unexplained why children do not always take beads from others, and why children who pass
the false belief task tend to do so more than those who fail the false belief task. Although the younger
children obviously were ambitious to ﬁll their own bead stands, they did not seem to be concerned
by the amount of beads on the opponents’ stands while playing. Only the older children (able to repre-
sent beliefs) took the other players’ scores into account.
There are other tasks that may seem to require telic perspective taking, including the sabotage task
by Sodian (1991) that, unfortunately, is inconclusive for our purposes (as discussed in the Introduc-
tion). A quite different task that should be beyond the teleologist is the separation between goals
and intentions (Shultz & Shamash, 1981; see reviews by Astington, 1999; Astington, 2001). Schult1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this argument and are also grateful for many other valuable comments
from the three reviewers that helped to improve the manuscript.
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some of which contained a ticket for a prize. For each toss, children needed to indicate which bucket
they intended to hit. On some trials they hit the intended bucket and on others they missed it, and on
some trials they won a prize and on others they did not—resulting in four different combinations. The
4- and 5-year-olds were remarkably accurate in answering all types of questions. The 3-year-olds, on
the other hand, had serious problems with questions about their intentions, in particular when satis-
faction of their intentions contrasted with satisfaction of their desires. This difﬁculty is expected if 3-
year-olds use teleology without perspective (Perner & Roessler, 2010, pp. 216–217). They know what
they want, that is, winning the prize. They also understand intentions to hit a particular bucket, albeit
only insofar as there are objective reasons for such intentions. Fortuitous success, where children acci-
dentally get the prize after hitting a bucket they did not intend to hit, poses a problem. To understand
that they did not intend to hit the bucket, children need to realize that they had no reason for hitting
that particular bucket despite the fact that doing so turned out to be conducive to reaching their goal.
A similar problem occurs in cases of bad luck, that is, where they hit the intended bucket without get-
ting a prize. To understand that they hit the bucket intentionally, children need to understand that
they did have a reason for hitting that bucket despite the fact that doing so turned out not to be con-
ducive to reaching their goal. Correct judgment of these cases becomes possible only when one under-
stands that one acted on the assumption that the prize might be in the bucket that one was aiming for.
Because in the critical cases this assumption has turned out to be false, the intentionality of the in-
tended action can be understood only if one can understand it in terms of the perspective of that
assumption.
In sum, our results support the view that at around 4 years of age, children become able to see
other people’s reasons for acting relative to these people’s perspective, both with respect to means
and with respect to objectives. There are many tasks that require awareness of perspective that are
mastered at this age and correlate with each other beyond general factors such as intelligence; exam-
ples include Level 2 perspective taking (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009), appearance–reality distinc-
tion (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Taylor & Carlson, 1997), interpreting ambiguous drawings (Doherty &
Wimmer, 2005), understanding false direction signs (Leekam, Perner, Healey, & Sewell, 2008; Parkin,
1994; Sabbagh, Moses, & Shiverick, 2006), alternative naming (Doherty & Perner, 1998; Perner et al.,
2002), episodic memory (Perner, Kloo, & Stöttinger, 2007; Perner & Ruffman, 1995), and understand-
ing identity information (Perner, Mauer, & Hildenbrand, 2011). Their understanding of intentional ac-
tion as acting for reasons follows this pattern. This is consistent with the theory proposed by Perner
and Roessler (2010) that children understand people’s reasons at ﬁrst in terms of teleology (objective
reasons). With their growing awareness of perspective differences, children become able to use tele-
ology within different perspectives. In this way, they can understand that someone may act rationally
even when he or she uses ineffective means or pursues objectives they do not share.
This approach introduces a neglected element into ‘‘theory of mind’’ research, namely that we and
our children do not primarily see people as being causally driven to certain behaviors by their desires
and information conditions, as theory theory portrays it (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997), but that people act
according to reasons (teleology) or what they take to be reasons from their perspective (teleology-
in-perspective). This is akin to simulation theory in that interpretation requires perspective taking.
However, unlike simulation, teleology-in-perspective does not essentially involve imaginative identi-
ﬁcation with others or recreating mental states in pretend mode (Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986).
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